Nuclear weapons have altered global geopolitics and the concepts of warfare in general, including war as well as diplomatic, geoeconomic, and cultural-ideological warfare. For a long time, the nuclear button was seen to be "the last argument", based on Japan"s fast capitulation on a single direct hit on Hiroshima and Nagasaki." We will not debate the need or historical veracity of such claims; what matters to us is the russists" assessment of their own military capabilities via the lens of the nuclear button, and the Europeans" sense of the equivalent risks to the russists.

Let"s start with analogies. The russists purposefully adopted the position of an international terrorist, as detailed in the preceding article, and incorporated this role model into their own identity. For russists, living alongside with other peoples and countries are akin to drinking wodka in preparation for a night search for "suckers" in order to grab a "freebie." When the target starts to act against him and seeks assistance from his pals, the global gopnik knows he can obtain a grenade, detonate a check, and wait until everyone has fled, leaving him his "freebie." Gopnik doesn"t need to blow up a grenade to show the targets how much damage they"ll take since there"s a tale about a guy who once lost his hand to a grenade at the opposite end of town.

On the one hand, it seems to us that the duration of people"s perceptions of the effects of a nuclear attack, as well as the experience of the affected country"s reaction to such a strike, define the eventual behaviors of those who threaten such a strike. However, not everything seems to be as straightforward as it appears. What if, on the other side, they refuse to undergo the procedure? How about throwing a grenade and blowing yourself up? Toss a grenade, flee, and forfeit a freebie? Is it better to flee and be ashamed? We are now discussing so-called real politics. This is about what can really happen in geopolitics.

Now, let us consider how this situation is perceived. Assume that residents of the streets around these nations" battlefields are watching from their windows, each supporting his own side of the war.  Some of them are russists, and a spectator from the outside may marvel how they maintain their composure while their pet perishes in this fight. And here is the most intriguing part: the changing of the russists people"s perceptions of their own army"s potential:

  1. Since the Soviet era, russists have been unable to accept the possibility of their army losing. They cannot believe it and will disregard any evidence to the contrary. This is the basis for all of their history and propaganda. This myth was vigorously promoted in the 1990"s, and he continues to exist to this day.
  2. As the amount of concerns about the army"s capability rises, so does the strength of denial. There include eyewitness accounts, veteran intelligence, and details regarding corruption schemes. The holy faith in the chief criminal of all criminals, their leader, contributes to dispelling some of these doubts.
  3. To avoid confronting reality, the russists, on the other hand, are developing a fantasy about omnipotent nuclear weapons. About how all countries will "kneel" in the face of the russists army"s might. (Notice how the narrative of nuclear weapons is inextricably linked to the narrative of military power and the transference of positive emotions?)
  4. Following that, all military order executors at all levels are given the opportunity to unwind and be less vigilant; after all, the nuclear weapon will always save everyone. Various military and paramilitary levels — possessed a sizable window of opportunity and moral authority to engage in russia"s traditional method of enrichment — theft and robbery, in this case of their own country.

Thus, athletes who have practiced wrestling for years are confronted by a broad, swollen former athlete who, at the time, did nothing extraordinary but kept his grenade in complete confidence of its effectiveness.

Thus, for russists, the nuclear button is a sweet pill that allows them to temporarily forget about their own military impotence, just as wars with democratically and nation-building countries are pills of civilian impotence and a means of denying it, but that is already the subject of another (probably one of the following) article.

The primary conclusion is that nuclear blackmail is a kind of self-medication for the russists. This is a phony substitute for one"s inherent potential. Of course, it may be frightening for Europeans, particularly Ukrainians.

To begin, since the nuclear chain, like everything else in russia, is inefficient. Even if you are involved, it will not work. Second, since everyone in russia is a pathological coward, the performers will undoubtedly suffer from psycho-emotional failure. Thirdly, if an insufficient schizophrenic desires to use a weapon, will the victim"s fear deter him? On February 24, the russian federation employed firearms against Ukraine and its civilian population, ostensibly for no cause and even in response to fabricated provocations. YES —  SIMPLY because the terrorists from russia desired it so much. And they did not require any justifications for this — except for one: the existence of a Ukraine free of russian influence. And what did the Ukrainian people do? They feared the russian army and nuclear blackmail? No — because fear will not help or affect anything, and will have no effect on the attacker in the first place. However, the absence of fear and solidarity on the part of Europeans and Ukrainians changes everything — because cooperative action and resistance to nuclear blackmail and aggression results in triumph!

The objective of this essay is not to calculate the likelihood of a nuclear attack or the magnitude of the harm that would result. We just ask that you do not succumb to other people"s delusions, that you maintain a position of strength, and that you always believe in our shared Victory.

Translated by Artem Ginkul

Bogdan Bevza

Andriy Ginkul